Almost all of the work in graphical models for game theory has mirrored previous work in probabilistic graphical models. Our work considers the opposite direction: Taking advantage of recent advances in equilibrium computation for probabilistic inference. In particular, we present formulations of inference problems in Markov random fields (MRFs) as computation of equilibria in a certain class of game-theoretic graphical models. While some previous work explores this direction, none of that work concretely establishes the precise connection between variational probabilistic inference in MRFs and correlated equilibria. There is no work that exploits recent theoretical and empirical results from the literature on algorithmic and computational game theory on the tractable, polynomial-time computation of exact or approximate correlated equilibria in graphical games with arbitrary, loopy graph structure. Our work discusses how to design new algorithms with equally tractable guarantees for the computation of approximate variational inference in MRFs. In addition, inspired by a previously stated game-theoretic view of state-of-the-art tree-reweighed (TRW) message-passing techniques for belief inference as zero-sum game, we propose a different, general-sum potential game to design approximate fictitious-play techniques. We perform synthetic experiments evaluating our proposed approximation algorithms with standard methods and TRW on several classes of classical Ising models (i.e., with binary random variables). Our experiments show that our global approach is competitive, particularly shinning in a class of Ising models with constant, "highly attractive" edge-weights, in which it is often better than all other alternatives we evaluated. While our more local approach was not as effective as our global approach or TRW, in fairness, almost all of the alternatives are often no better than a simple baseline: estimate the marginal probability to be 0.5.
Introduction
Almost all of the work in graphical games has borrowed heavily from analogies to probabilistic graphical models. However, over-reliance on those analogies and previous standard approaches to exact inference might have led that approach to face the same computational roadblocks that plagued most exact-inference techniques.
As is common knowledge within the graphical models community, exact inference is tractable in probabilistic graphical models whose graphs have bounded treewidth. Except for a few special cases such as Ising models with planar graphs without node biases, or with other very specific edge-weight properties, 1 the problem is for the most part considered intractable outside those confines [1, 3, 4] . Section 3 is the main technical section of the paper. It shows reductions of different problems in belief inference in MRFs as computing equilibria in graphical potential games compactly represented as Gibbs potential games [11] . The reductions presented here vary in generality from MAP assignment, marginals, and full-joint estimation to pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE), mixedstrategy Nash equilibria (MSNE), and correlated equilibria (CE), respectively. We briefly discuss a connection between Papadimitriou's algorithm, as well as Jiang and Leyton-Brown's, and the work of Jaakkola and Jordan [14] on variational approximations to the problem of probabilistic inference in MRFs via mean-field mixtures. The paper also includes a discussion on the connections to previous work in computer vision on the problem of relaxation labeling, and work on game-theoretic approaches to (Bayesian) statistical estimation. We then present an alternative approach based on a more global view of the problem, in contrast to the more local approach of the formulations mentioned above. More specifically, we formulate the inference problem using a two-player potential game, inspired by the work on tree reweighed (TRW) message-passing [15] . We propose a special type of sequential, "hybrid" standard and stochastic fictitious play algorithm for belief inference.
Section 4 reports on our experimental evaluation. We compare our proposed algorithms to the popular, most commonly used, standard, and easily implementable approximation techniques in use today.
Section 5 discusses future work and suggests new opportunities for other potential research directions, beyond those already discussed in the main technical sections of the paper.
Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of our contributions.
Preliminaries
This section introduces basic notation and concepts in graphical models and game theory used throughout the paper. It also includes brief statements on current state-of-the-art mathematical and computational results in the area.
Basic Notation. Denote by x ≡ (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) an n-dimensional vector and by x −i ≡ (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) the same vector without component i. Similarly, for every set S ⊂ [n] ≡ {1, . . . , n}, denote by x S ≡ (x i : i ∈ S) the (sub-)vector formed from x using only components in S, such that, letting S c ≡ [n] − S denote the complement of S, we can denote x ≡ (x S , x S c ) ≡ (x i , x −i ) for every i. If A 1 , . . . , A n are sets, denote by A ≡ × i∈[n] A i , A −i ≡ × j∈[n]−{i} A j and A S ≡ × j∈S A j .
Graph Terminology and Notation. Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph, with finite set of n vertices or nodes V = {1, . . . , n} and a set of (undirected) edges E. For each node i, let N (i) ≡ {j | (i, j) ∈ E} be the set of neighbors of i in G, not including i, and N (i) ≡ N (i) ∪ {i} the set including i. A clique C of G is a set of nodes with the property that they are all mutually connected: for all i, j ∈ C, (i, j) ∈ E; in addition, C is maximal if there is no other node k outside C that is also connected to each node in C, i.e., for all k ∈ V − C, (k, i) / ∈ E for some i ∈ C.
Another useful concept in the context of this paper is that of hypergraphs, which are generalizations of regular graphs. A hypergraph graph G = (V, E) is defined by a set of nodes V and a set of hyperedges E ⊂ 2 V . We can think of the hyperedges as cliques in a regular graph. Indeed, the primal graph of the hypergraph is the graph induced by the node set V and where there is an edge between two nodes if they both belong to the same hyperedge; in other words, the primal graph is the graph induced by taking each hyperedge and forming cliques of nodes in a regular graph.
Probabilistic Graphical Models
Probabilistic graphical models are an elegant marriage of probability and graph theory that has had tremendous impact in the theory and practice of modern artificial intelligence, machine learning, and statistics. It has permitted effective modeling of large, structured high-dimensional complex systems found in the real world. The language of probabilistic graphical models allows us to capture the structure of complex interactions between individual entities in the system within a single model. The core component of the model is a graph in which each node i corresponds to a random variable X i and the edges express conditional independence assumptions about those random variables in the probabilistic system.
Markov Random Fields, Gibbs Distributions, and the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem
By definiton, a joint probability distribution P is a Markov random field (MRF) with respect to (wrt) an undirected graph G if for all x, for every node i, P (X i = x i | X −i = x −i ) = P (X i = x i | X N (i) = x N (i) ). In that case, the neighbors/variables X N (i) form the Markov blanket of node/variable X i .
Also by definition, a joint distribution P is a Gibbs distribution wrt an undirected graph G if it can be expressed as P (X = x) = C∈C Φ C (x C ) for some functions Φ C indexed by a clique C ∈ C, the set of all (maximal) cliques in G, and mapping every possible value x C that the random variables X c associated with the nodes in C can take to a non-negative number.
We say that a joint probability distribution P is positive if it has full support (i.e., P (x) > 0 for all x). [16] ) Let P be a positive joint probability distribution. Then, P is an MRF with respect to G if and only if P is a Gibbs distribution with respect to G.
In the context of the theorem, the functions Φ C are positive, which allows us to define MRFs in terms of local potential functions {φ C } over each clique C in the graph. Define the function Ψ(x) ≡ C∈C φ C (x C ). Let us refer to any function of this form as a Gibbs potential with respect to G. A more familiar expression of an MRF is P (X = x) ∝ exp( C∈C φ C (x C )) = exp(Ψ(x)).
Some Inference-Related Problems in MRFs
One problem of interest in an MRF is to compute a most likely assignment x * ∈ arg max x P (X = x) = arg max x C∈C φ C (x C )); that is, the most likely outcome with respect to the MRF P . Another problem is to compute the individual marginal probabilities P (
A related problem is to compute the normalizing constant Z = x exp( C∈C φ C (x C ))) (also known as the partition function of the MRF).
Another set of problems concern so called "belief updating." That is, computing information related to the posterior probability distribution P having observed the outcome of some of the variables, also known as the evidence. For MRFs, this problem is computationally equivalent to that of computing prior marginal probabilities.
Brief Overview of Computational Results in Probabilistic Graphical Models
Both the exact and approximate versions of most inference-related problems in MRFs are in general intractable (e.g., NP-hard), although polynomial-time algorithms do exists for some special cases (see, e.g., Istrail [1] , Wang et al. [2] , and the references therein). The complexity of exact algorithms is usually characterized by structural properties of the graph, and the typical statement is that running times are polynomial only for graphs with bounded treewidth (see, e.g., Russell and Norvig [17] for more information). Several deterministic and randomize approximation approaches exist (see, e.g., Jordan et al. [18] , Jaakkola [19] , Geman and Geman [20] ).
Game Theory
Game theory [21] provides a mathematical model of the stable behavior (or outcome) that may result from the interaction of rational individuals. This paper concentrates in noncooperative settings: individuals maximize their own utility, act independently, and do not have (direct) control over the behavior of others. 4 The positivity constraint is only necessary for the "only if" case proof of the theorem. 5 Individual rationality here means that each player seeks to maximize their own utility. Also note that, while many parlor "win-lose"/zero-sum games involve competition, in general, noncooperative = competitive: each player just wants to do the best for himself, regardless of how useful or harmful his behavior is to others.
The concept of equilibrium is central to game theory. Roughly, an equilibrium in a noncooperative game is a point of strategic stance, where no individual player can gain by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium behavior.
Games and their Representation
Let V = [n] denote a finite set of n players in a game. For each player i ∈ V , let A i denote the set of actions or pure strategies that i can play. Let A ≡ × i∈V A i denote the set of joint actions, x ≡ (x i , . . . , x n ) ∈ A denote a joint action, and x i the individual action of player i in x. Denote by x −i ≡ (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) the joint action of all the players except i, such that x ≡ (x i , x −i ). Let M i : A → R denote the payoff/utility function of player i. If the A i 's are finite, then M i is called the payoff matrix of player i. Games represented this way are called normal-or strategic-form games.
There are a variety of compact representations for large game inspired by probabilistic graphical models in AI and machine learning [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . The results of this paper are presented in the context of the following generalization of graphical games [23] , a simple but powerful model inspired by probabilistic graphical models such as MRFs previously defined by Ortiz [27] . 6 Definition 1. A graphical multi-hypermatrix game (GMhG) is defined by
• a directed graph G = (V, E) in which there is a node i ∈ V in G for each of the n players in the game (i.e., |V | = n), and the set of directed edges, or arcs, E defines a set of neighbors N (i) ≡ {j | (j, i) ∈ E, i = j} whose action affect the payoff function of i (i.e., j is a neighbor of i if and only if there is an arc from j to i); and
-a set of actions A i , -a hypergraph where the vertex set is its (inclusive) neighborhood N (i) ≡ N (i) ∪ {i} and the hyperedge set is a set of cliques of players C i ⊂ 2 N (i) , and
The interpretation of a GMhG is that, for each player i, the local and global payoff (hyper)matrices
Graphical potential games. Graphical potential games are special instances of GMhGs. They play a key role in establishing a stronger connection between probabilistic inference in MRFs and equilibria in games than previously noted. Ortiz [11] provides a characterization of graphical potential games, and discusses the implication of convergence of certain kinds of "playing" processes in games based on connections to the Gibbs sampler [20] , via the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem [16, 28] . Yu and Berthod [29] (implicitly) used graphical potential games to establish an equivalence between local maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) inference in Markov random fields and Nash equilibria of the game, a topic revisited in Section 3.1. 
Equilibria as Solution Concepts
Equilibria are generally considered the solutions of games. Various notions of equilibria exist. A pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium (PSNE) of a game is a joint action x * such that for all players i, and for all actions
That is, no player can improve its payoff by unilaterally deviating from its prescribed equilibrium x * i , assuming the others stick to their actions x * −i . Some games, such as the extensively-studied Prisoner's Dilemma, have PSNE; many others, such as "playground" Rock-Paper-Scissors, do not. This is problematic because it will not be possible to "solve" some games using PSNE.
A mixed-strategy of player i is a probability distribution Q i over A i such that Q(x i ) is the probability that i chooses to play action x i . 8 A joint mixed-strategy is a joint probability distribution Q capturing the players behavior, such that Q(x) is the probability that joint action x is played, or in other words, each player i plays action in component x i of x. Because we are assuming that the players play independently, Q is a product distribution:
the joint mixed strategies of all the players except i. The expected payoff of a player i when some joint mixed-strategy Q is played is x Q(x)M i (x); abusing notation, denote it by M i (Q). The conditional expected payoff of a player i given that he plays action x i is
A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is a joint mixed-strategy Q * that is a product distribution formed by the individual players mixed strategies Q * i such that, for all players i, and any other alternative mixed strategy Q i for his play,
Every game in normalform has at least one such equilibrium [30, 31] . Thus, every game has an MSNE "solution."
One relaxation of MSNE considers the case where the amount of gain each player can obtain from unilateral deviation is very small. This concept is particularly useful to study approximation versions of the computational problem. Given ≥ 0, an (approximate) -Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is defined as above, except that the expected gain condition becomes
Several refinements and generalizations of MSNE have been proposed. One of the most interesting generalizations is that of a correlated equilibrium (CE) [32] . In contrast to MSNE, a CE can be a full joint distribution, and thus characterize more complex joint-action behavior by players. Formally, a correlated equilibrium (CE) is a joint probability distribution Q over A such that, for all players i,
is the (marginal) probability that player i will play x i according to Q and
is the conditional given x i . An MSNE is CE that is a product distribution. An equivalent expression of the CE condition above is
As was the case for MSNE, we can relax the condition of deviation to account for potential gains from small deviation. Given > 0, adding the term "− " to the right-hand-side of the condition above defines an (approximate) -CE.
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CE have several conceptual and computational advantages over MSNE. For instance, all players may achieve better expected payoffs in a CE than those achievable in any MSNE; 10 some "natural" forms of play are guaranteed to converge to the (set of) CE [12, [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] ; and CE is consistent with a Bayesian framework [38] , something not yet possible, and apparently unlikely for MSNE [39] .
Brief Overview of Results in Computational Game Theory
There has been an explosion of computational results on different equilibrium concepts on a variety of game representations and settings since the beginning of this century. The following is a brief summary. We refer the reader to a book by Nisan et al. [40] for a (partial) introduction to this research area.
The problem for two-player zero-sum games, where the sum of the entries of both matrix is zero, and therefore only one matrix is needed to represent the game, can be solved in polynomial time: It is equivalent to linear programming [21, 41, 42] . After being open for over 50 years, the problems of the complexity of computing MSNE in games was finally settled recently, following a very rapid sequence of results in the last part of 2005 [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] : Computing MSNE is likely to be hard in the worst case (i.e., PPAD-complete [48] ), even in games with only two players [46, [49] [50] [51] [52] . The result of Fabrikant et al. [53] suggests that computing PSNE in succinctly representable games is also likely to be intractable in the worst case (i.e., PLS-complete [54] ). A common statement is that computing MSNE, and in some cases even PSNE, with "special properties" is hard in the worst case [55] [56] [57] . Computing approximate MSNE is also thought to be hard in the worst case [51, 58] .
Most current results for computing exact and approximate PSNE or MSNE in graphical games essentially mirror those for MRFs and constraint networks: polynomial time for bounded treewidth graph; intractable in general [23, 27, 56, 59] . This is unsurprising because they were mostly inspired by analogous versions in probabilistic graphical models and constraint networks in AI, and therefore share similar characteristics. Several heuristics exist for dealing with general graphs [59] [60] [61] .
In contrast, there exist polynomial-time algorithms for computing CE, both for normal-form games (where the problem reduces to a simple linear feasibility problem) and even most succinctlyrepresentable games known today [8, 9] , including graphical games.
Equilibria and Inference
The line of work presented in this section is partly motivated by the following question: Can we leverage advances in computational game theory for problems in the probabilistic graphical models community? Establishing a strong bilateral connection between both problems may help us answer this question.
The literature on computing equilibria in games has skyrocketed since the beginning of this century. As we discover techniques developed early on within the game theory community, and as new results are generated from the extremely active computational game theory community, we may be able to adapt those techniques for solving games to the inference setting. If we can establish a strong bilateral connection between inference problems and the computation of equilibria, we may be able to relate algorithms in both areas and exchange previously unknown results in each.
Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Approximate MAP Inference
Consider an MRF P with respect to graph G and Gibbs potential Ψ defined by the set of potential functions {φ C }. For each node i, denote by C i ⊂ C the subset of cliques in G that include i. Note that the (inclusive) neighborhood of player is given by N (i) = ∪ C∈Ci C.
Define an MRF-induced GMhG, and more specifically, a (hyperedge-symmetric) hypergraphical game [8, 11] , with the same graph G, and for each player i, hypergraph with hyperedges C i and local-clique payoff hypermatrices M i,C (x C ) ≡ φ C (x C ) for all C ∈ C i . A few observations about the game are in order. Property 1. The representation size of the MRF-induced game is the same as that of the MRF: not exponential in the largest neighborhood size, but the size of the largest clique in G.
Property 2. The MRF-induced game is a graphical potential game [11] with graph G and (Gibbs) potential function Ψ: i.e., for all i, x and x i ,
Remark 1. Through the connection established by the last property, it is easy to see that sequential best-response dynamics is guaranteed to converge to a PSNE of the game in finite time, regardless of the initial play. 11 In fact, we can conclude that a joint-action x * is a PSNE of the game if and only if x * is a local maxima or a critical point of the MRF P . Thus, the MRF-induced game, like all potential games [62] , always has PSNE. 12 Similarly, for any potential game, one can define a game-induced MRF using the potential function of the game whose set of local maxima (and critical points) corresponds exactly to the set of PSNE of the potential game. Through this connection we can show that solving the local-MAP problem in MRFs is PLS-complete in general [53] . 13 One question that comes to mind is whether one can say anything about the properties of the globally optimal assignment in the game-induced MRF and the payoff it supports for the players. Or whether it can be characterized by stronger notions of equilibria. For example, are strong NE, in which no coalition of players could obtain a Pareto dominated set of payoffs by unilaterally deviating, joint MAP assignments of the MFR? Or more generally, what characteristics can we assign to the MAP assignments of the game-induced MRF?
In short, we can use algorithms for PSNE as heuristics to compute locally optimal MAP assignments of P and vice versa.
14 Remark 2. Daskalakis et al. [66] extended results in game theory characterizing the number of PSNE in normal-form games (see Stanford [67] , Rinott and Scarsini [68] , and the references therein) to graphical games, but now taking into consideration the network structure of the game. Information about the number of PSNE in games can provide additional insight on the structure of MRFs.
For example, one of the results of Daskalakis et al. [66] states that for graphs respecting certain expansion properties as the number of nodes/players increases, the number of PSNE of the graphical game will have a limiting distribution that is a Poisson with expected value 1. Also according to Daskalakis et al. [66] , a similar behavior occurs for games with graphs generated according to the Erdös-Rényi model with sufficiently high average-degree (i.e., reasonably high connectivity). Thus, either the set of MRF-induced games has significantly low measure relative to the set of all possible randomly generated games (something that seems likely), or the number of local maxima (and critical points) of the MRF will have a similar distribution, and thus that number is expected to be low. The latter would suggest that local algorithms such as the max-product algorithm may be less likely to get stuck in local maxima (or critical points) of the MRF.
In addition, there have been several results stating that PSNE are unlikely to exist in many graphs, and that, when they do exist, they are not that many [66] . 15 MRF-induced games would in that sense represent a very rich class of non-randomly generated graphical games for which the results above do not hold.
Mixed-strategy Equilibria and Belief Inference
Going beyond PSNE and MAP estimation, this subsection begins to establish a stronger, and potentially more useful connection between probabilistic inference and more general concepts of equilibria in games.
Let S be a subset of the players (i.e., nodes in the graph) and denote by Q S (x S ) ≡ x V −S Q(x) the (marginal) probability distribution of Q over possible joint actions of players in S. Consider the space of assignments for the MRF, which is guaranteed to converge to a local maxima (or critical points) of the MRF. 12 This result should not be surprising given that other researchers have established a one-to-one relationship between the complexity class PLS [54] , which characterizes local search problems, of which finding local maxima of the MRF is an instance, and (ordinal) potential games [53] . 13 A direct proof of this result follows from [63] , and in particular, the result for Hopfield neural networks [64] . A Hopfield neural network can be seen as an MRF, and more specifically, and Ising model, when the weights on the edges are symmetric. Similarly, any Hopfield neural network can be seen as a polymatrix game [65] ; when the weights are symmetric the network can be seen as a potential game (in particular, it is an instance of a party affiliation game [53] ). Indeed, a stable configuration in an arbitrary Hopfield neural network is equivalent to a PSNE of a corresponding polymatrix game. (See Papadimitriou et al. [63] and Miller and Zucker [65] for the relevant references.) 14 Note that algorithms for PSNE can in principle find critical points of P . In either case, algorithms such as the max-product version of belief propagation (BP) can only provide such local-optimum/critical-point convergence guarantees in general. 15 In particular, the number of PSNE has a Poisson distribution with parameter 1.
condition for correlated equilibria (CE), which for the MRF-induced game we can express as, for all i,
Commuting the sums and simplifying we get the following equivalent condition:
(1) This simplification is important because it highlights that, modulo expected payoff equivalence, we only need distributions over the original cliques, not the induced neighbohoods/Markov blankets, to represent CE in this class of games (in contrast to Kakade et al. [7] ); thus, we are able to maintain the size of the representation of the CE to be the same as that of the game.
As an alternative, we can use the fact that the MRF-induced game is a potential game and, via some definitions and algebraic manipulation, get the following sequence of equivalent conditions, which hold for all i, x i and x i .
Rewriting the last expression, we get the following equivalent condition: for all i, x i and x i ,
The following are some additional remarks on the implications of the last condition. 16 Remark 3. First, it is useful to introduce the following notation. For any distribution Q , let
be the cross entropy between probability distributions Q and P , with respect to P . 17 Denote by
) the marginal distribution of play over the joint-actions of all players except player i. Denote by
Then, condition 2 implies the following sequence of conditions, which hold for all i.
Hence, any CE of the MRF-induced game is a kind of approximate local optimum (or critical point) of an approximation of the MRF based on a special type of cross entropy minimization.
The following property summarizes this remark. Property 3. For any MRF P , any correlated equilibria Q of the game induced by P satisfies
Remark 4. Let us introduce some additional notation. For any joint distribution of play Q , let
] be its entropy. Similarly, for any player i, for any marginal/individual distribution of play
the conditional entropy of the individual play of player i given the joint play of all the players except i, with respect to Q.
Then, we can express the condition 2 as the following equivalent conditions, which hold for all i.
Hence, any CE of a MRF-induced game is a kind of approximate local optimum (or critical point) of a special kind of variational approximation of the MRF. The following property summarizes this remark. Property 4. For any MRF P , any correlated equilibria Q of the game induced by P satisfies
Note that the last property implies that the approximation Q satisfies the local condition
Before continuing exploring connections to CE, it is instructive to first consider MSNE.
Mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria and Mean-Field Approximations
In the special case of MSNE, the joint mixed strategy
the (marginal) joint action of play over all the players except i, and denote by (Q i Q × −i ) the probability distribution defined such that the probability of
In this special case, the equilibrium conditions imply the following conditions, which hold for all i:
This implies that
The last condition is equivalent to
which, in turn, we can express as H(Q, P ) = min Q i H(Q Q × , P ) . The last expression is also equivalent to
Hence, a NE Q of the game is almost a locally optimal mean-field approximation, except for the extra entropic term. In summary, for MSNE we have the following tighter condition than for arbitrary CE. Property 5. For any MRF P , any MSNE Q of the game induced by P satisfies KL(
Note that the last property implies that the mean-field approximation Q satisfies the local condition
One possible way to address the issue of the extra entropic term is to consider instead the MRFinduced infinite game, where each player i has the (continuous) utility function 18 In an infinite game the sets of actions or pure strategies are uncountable. Existence of equilibria holds under reasonable conditions (i.e., each set of actions is a nonempty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and each player utility is continuous and quasi-concave in the player's action), all of which are satisfied by the MRF-induced infinite game considered here. (See Fudenberg and Tirole [70] for more information.) and wants to maximize over its mixed-strategy Q i given the other player mixed-strategies Q j for all j = i. Property 6. The MRF-induced infinite game defined above is an infinite Gibbs potential game with the same graph G and the following potential over the set of individual (product) mixed strategies
where Z is the normalizing constant for P . From this we can derive that the individual player mixed-strategies {Q i } are a "pure strategy" equilibrium of the infinite game if and only if
Or, in other words, if Q is a PSNE of the infinite game, then Q is also a local optimum (or critical point) of the mean-field approximation of P . Remark 5. The local payoff function defined above for the infinite game also has connections to the game theory literature on learning in games [12] . This area studies properties of processes by which players "learn" how to play in (usually repeated) games; specially properties related to the existence of convergence of the learning (or playing) dynamics to equilibria. In particular, the local payoff function is similar to that used by logistic fictitious play, a special version of a "learning" process called smooth fictitious play. The difference is that the last entropy term involving the individual player's mixed strategy has a regularization-type factor λ > 0 such that players play strict bestresponse as λ → 0. In addition, logistic fictitious play is an instance of a learning process that, if followed by a player, achieves so called approximate universal consistency (i.e., roughly, in the limit of infinite play, the average of the payoffs obtained by the player will be close to the best obtained overall during repeated play, regardless of how the other players behave), for appropriate values of λ depending on the desired approximation level.
Indeed, it is not hard to see that in fact the best-response mixed-strategy Q i of player i to the mixed strategies Q N (i) of their neighbors is
) . Hence, running sequential best-response dynamics in the MRF-induced infinite game is equivalent to finding a variational mean-field approximation via recursive updating of the first derivative conditions. 19 The process will then be equivalent to minimizing the function F (Q) ≡ KL(Q P ) by axis-parallel updates. The resulting sequence of distributions/mixed-strategies monotonically decreases the value of F and is guaranteed to converge to a local optimum or a critical point of F . Hence, the corresponding learning process is guaranteed to converge to a PSNE of the infinite game, which is in turn approximate MSNE of the original game. But this is not surprising in retrospect, given the last property (Property 6). That property essentially states a broader property of all potential games: they are isomorphic to so called games with identical interests [62] , which are games where every player has exactly the same payoff function. Remark 6. The previous discussion suggests that we could use appropriately-modified versions of algorithms for MSNE, such as NashProp [61] , as heuristics to obtain a mean-field approximation of the true marginals.
Going in the opposite direction, the discussion above also suggests that, by treating any (graphical) potential game as an MRF, for any fixed λ > 0, logistic fictitious play in any potential game converges to an approximate (λ/ min i |A i |)-MSNE of the potential game. Indeed, there has been recent work in this direction, which explores the connection between learning in games and mean-field approximations in machine learning [71] . That work proposes new algorithms based on fictitious play for simple mean-field approximation applied to statistical (Bayesian) estimation.
The game-induced MRF is a λ-temperature Gibbs measure. As we take λ → 0, we get the limiting 0-temperature Gibbs measure which is a probability distribution over the set of global maxima of the potential function of the game, and 0 probability everywhere (i.e., the support of the limiting distribution is the set of joint-actions that maximize the potential function). The support of the 0-temperature Gibbs measure is a subset of the "globally optimal" PSNE of the potential game. But there might be other equilibria corresponding to local optima (or critical points) of the potential function.
Are there other connections between the Nash equilibria of the game and the support of the limiting distribution?
Correlated Equilibria and Higher-order Variational Approximations
Kakade et al. [7] designed polynomial-time algorithms based on linear programming for computing CE in standard graphical games with tree graphs. The approach and polynomial-time results extend to graphical games with bounded-tree-width graphs and graphical polymatrix games with tree graphs. Ortiz et al. [72] (see also Ortiz et al. [73] ) proposed the principle of maximum entropy (MaxEnt) for equilibrium selection of CE in graphical games. They studied several properties of the MaxEnt CE, designed a monotonically increasing algorithm to compute it, and discussed a learningdynamics view of the algorithm. Kamisetty et al. [74] employed advances in approximate inference methods to propose approximation algorithms to compute CE. In all of those cases, the general approach is to use ideas from probabilistic graphical models to design algorithms to compute CE. The focus of this paper is the opposite direction: employing ideas from game theory to design algorithms for belief inference in probabilistic graphical models.
Property 4 suggests that we can use the CE for the MRF-induced game as a heuristic approximation to higher-order variational approximations. In fact, one would argue that in the context of inference, doing so is more desirable because, in principle, it can lead to better approximations that can capture more aspects of the joint distribution than a simple mean-field approximation would alone. For example, mean-field approximations are likely to be poor if the MRF is multi-modal. Motivated by this fact, Jaakkola and Jordan [14] suggest using mixture of product distributions to improve the simple variational mean-field approximation.
Some Computational Implications
But, consider the algorithms of Papadimitriou [8] or Jiang and Leyton-Brown [9] (see also Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [6] and Jiang and Leyton-Brown [10] ), which we can use to compute a CE of the MRF-induced game in polynomial time. Such CE will be, by construction, also a (polynomiallysized) mixture of product distributions. (In the case of Jiang and Leyton-Brown's algorithm it will be a mixture of a subset of the joint-action space, which is equivalent to a probability mas function over a polynomially-sized subset of the joint-action space; said differently, a mixture of product of indicator functions, each product corresponding to particular outcomes of the joint-action space.) Hence, the algorithms of Papadimitriou and Jiang and Leyton-Brown both provide a means to obtain a heuristic estimate of a local optimum (or critical point) of such a mixture in polynomial time. The result would not be exactly the same as that obtained by Jaakkola and Jordan [14] in general, because of the extra entropic term mentioned in the discussion earlier. Can we find alternative versions of the payoff matrices, and/or alter Papadimitriou's algorithm, so that the resulting correlated equilibria provides an exact answer to the approximate inference problem that uses mixtures of product distributions? Regardless, at the very least one could use the resulting CE to initialize the technique of Jaakkola and Jordan [14] without specifying an a priori number of mixtures.
Having said that, both Papadimitriou's and Jiang and Leyton-Brown's algorithms make a polynomial number of calls to the ellipsoid-algorithm, or more specifically, its "oracle," to obtain each of the product distributions whose mixture will form the output CE. It is known that the ellipsoid algorithm is slow in practice. Papadimitriou [8] , Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [6] , and Jiang and LeytonBrown [9] leave open the design of more practical algorithms based on interior-point methods.
Finally, this connection also suggests that we can (in principle) use any learning algorithm that guarantees convergence to the set of CE (as described in the section on preliminaries on game theory where the concept was introduced) as a heuristic for approximate inference. Several so-called "noregret" learning algorithms satisfy those conditions. Indeed, we use a variant of a simple version of a "no-regret" algorithm in our experiments. Viewed that way, such learning algorithms would be similar in spirit to stochastic simulation algorithms with a kind of "adaptivity" reminiscent of the work on adaptive importance sampling (see, e.g., Cheng and Druzdzel [75] , Ortiz and Kaelbling [76] , Ortiz [77] , and the references therein). Establishing a possible stronger connection between learning in games, CE, and probabilistic inference seems like a promising direction for future research. In fact, as previously mentioned (at the end of Remark 5), there has already been some recent work in this direction, but specifically for MSNE and mean-field approximations [71] .
Later in this paper, we present the results of an experimental evaluation of the performance of a simple no-regret learning algorithm in computational game theory in the context of probabilistic inference. We delay the details until the Experiments section.
Other Previous and Related Work
Earlier work on the so called "relaxation labeling" problem in AI and computer vision [78, 79] has established connections to polymatrix games [80] (see also Hummel and Zucker [81] , although the connection had yet to be recognized at that time). That work also establishes connections to inference in Hopfield networks, dynamical systems, and polymatrix games [79, 82] . A reduction of MAP to PSNE in what we call here a GMhG was introduced by Yu and Berthod [29] in the same context (see also Berthod et al. [83] ); although they concentrate on pairwise potentials, which reduce to polymatrix games in this context. Because, in addition, the ultimate goal in MAP inference is to obtain a global optimum configuration, Yu and Berthod [29] proposed a Metropolis-Hastings-style algorithm in an attempt to avoid local minima. Their algorithm is similar to simulated annealing algorithms used for solving satisfiability problems, and other local methods such as WalkSAT [84] (see, e.g., Russell and Norvig [17] for more information). The algorithm can also be seen as a kind of learning-in-games scheme [12] based on best-response with random exploration (or "trembling hand" best response). That is, at every round, some best-response is taken with some probability, otherwise the previous response is replayed. Zucker [82] presents a modern account of that work. The connection to potential games, and all its well-known properties (e.g., convergence of best-response dynamics) does not seem to have been recognized within that literature. Also, none of the work makes connections to higher-order (i.e., beyond mean-field) inference approximation techniques or the game-theoretic notion of CE.
Approximate Fictitious Play in a Two-player Potential Game for Belief Inference in Ising Models
This section presents a game-theoretic fictitious-play approach to estimation of node-marginal probabilities in MRFs. The approach this time is more global in terms of how we use the whole jointdistribution for the estimation of individual marginal probabilities. The inspiration for the approach presented here falls from the work of Wainwright et al. [15] . The section concentrates on Ising models, an important, special MRF instance from statistical physics with its own interesting history.
Definition 2. An Ising model wrt an undirected graph G = (V, E) is an MRF wrt G such that
is the set of node biases b i 's and edge-weights w ij 's, which are the parameters defining the joint distribution P θ over {−1, +1} n .
It is fair to say that interest on more general classes of MRFs originates from the special class of Ising models. It is also fair to say that, because of the relative simplicity and importance of Ising models for problems in statistical physics, as well as to other ML and AI applications areas such as computer vision and NLP, Ising models have become the most common platforms in which to empirically study approximation algorithms for arbitrary MRFs. In short, simplicity of presentation and empirical evaluation guide the focus of Ising models in this section: Generalizations to arbitrary MRFs are straightforward but cumbersome to present. Hence, in this manuscript, we omit the details of such generalizations.
As an outline, the current section begins with an algorithmic instantiation of the iterative approach. The exact instantiation depends on whether we are using CE or MSNE as the solution concept.
The section then follows with an informal discussion of the game-theoretic foundations of the general framework behind the approach, and a discussion of immediate implications to computational properties and potential convergence.
Denote by T G the set of all spanning trees of connected (undirected) graph G = (V, E) that are maximal with respect to E (i.e., does not contain any spanning forests). If spanning tree T ∈ T G , we denote by E(T ) ⊂ E the set of edges of T .
Initialize x (1) ← Uniform({−1, +1} n ), and for each (i, j) ∈ E, µ
j . At each iteration l = 1, 2, . . . , m,
7: end for
For each Ising-model's random-variable index i = 1, . . . , n, set p
as the estimate of the exact Ising-model's marginal probability p i ≡ P(X i = 1).
Within the literature on probabilisitic graphical models, Hamze and de Freitas [85] propose an MCMC approach based on sampling non-overlapping trees. While our approach has a sampling flavor, its exact connection to MCMC is unclear at best. Also, the spanning trees that our algorithm generates may overlap.
The following discussion connects the algorithm above to an approximate version of fictitious play from the literature on learning in games in game theory. For the most part, we omit discussions to approximate variational inference in this manuscript, except to say that TRW message-passing [15] is the inspiration behind our proposed algorithm above.
The game implicit in the heuristic algorithm above is a two-player potential game between a "joint-assignment" (JA) player and a "spanning-tree" (ST) player. The potential function is
The payoff functions M X and M T of the JA player and the ST player, respectively, are identical and equal the potential function
Note that the payoff function of the ST player is strategically equivalent to the function ( 
Technically, this is a game with identical payoffs, which are known to have what Monderer and Shapley [86] called the fictitious play property: the empirical play of fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to an MSNE of the game. While determining a best-response for the ST player is easy (i.e., using an algorithm for computing maximal spanning tree such as Kruskal's, as we do in our implementation for the experiments), unfortunately the same is in general not possible for the JA player, whose best-response is as hard as computing a MAP assignment of another Ising model with the same graph and (generally non-zero) bias/node parameters, but a slightly different set of edge-weights. 20 One approach to deal with the problem of obtaining a best-response from the JA player is to draw one tree uniformly at random from the empirical distribution and find a best-response to that tree. Such an approach is equivalent to a type of smooth best-response. If both players were to do the same, simultaneously, the result is a stochastic version of fictitious play or stochastic fictitious play 20 As mentioned earlier, there are some instances for which this computation is actually possible in polynomial time. In fact, this would have been possible for the type of Ising models with planar two-dimensional grid graph, also known as a "square lattices," we used in the experiments, if we would have chosen those models to have zero biases, or the edge-weights had some special characteristics. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the specific Ising models randomly drawn would satisfy those conditions in general. As we discuss shortly, we settle for a simple computation of the best-response for the JA player using stochastic fictitious play [12] .
for short [12] . The empirical distribution of play of stochastic fictitious play in a game with identical payoffs, or what's strategically equivalent, any potential game, also converges to an MSNE of the game [87] . In our case, however, we really have a type of "hybrid" sequential-version, where the ST player is always behaving as in standard fictitious play, while the JA player is behaving according to a stochastic fictitious play.
In addition, as an alternative to the best-response computation for player JA, we might want to add an entropic (preference) function of the mixed-strategy to the JA player as an additional term in JA's payoff, so that the result is really a "smooth" best-response, or more specifically in this case a smooth stochastic fictitious play [12] . Such an addition would make the connection to variational inference more evident, and would allow us to develop more direct bounds on the quality of the variational result. The main problem is that we do not know of any study of such hybrids within game theory. In addition, most instances of fictitious play assume simultaneous moves. Numerical instability is another problem we found in practice when using such smooth best-response. Even in instances where that was not a problem, the performance was indistinguishable, in a formal statistical sense, from the version of the algorithm that we propose above.
In the context of belief inference, we believe it actually makes more sense to have a so called "sequential" play, where players trade moves: the JA player starts by choosing some action (i.e., full, joint assignments to the random variables), the ST player best-responds to that action, then the JA player best-responds to the ST player's action, continuing in that way, such that at each round, each player is best-responding to the empirical distribution of play 21 up to the time the player makes a move (i.e., draws an action). While this type of sequential process often helps to stabilize the dynamics and improve the likelihood of convergence, it seems that such sequential processes have received considerably less attention than their simultaneous-move counterpart within the game-theory community.
We conjecture, however, that the type of fictitious play process defined above in fact converges. We believe that the proof follows from combining results from standard and stochastic fictitious play for games with identical payoffs, which are (strategically equivalent) instances of potential games [86, 87] . The derivation is complex and not trivial, involving key mathematical concepts from the literature in stochastic approximation. Delving into such level of complexity not only goes beyond the scope of this paper, but more importantly, doing so distracts attention from the paper's main focus: to provide a general, broad illustration of how ideas and results from game theory may be useful in providing alternative, effective, and practical approaches to hard belief-inference problems in probabilistic graphical models. Thus, we leave the formal proof of our conjecture as future work.
As a last point, it is important to understand and keep in mind that, as it is well-known, in the context of potential games, while sequential best-reply converges to a PSNE (i.e., a joint assignment), fictitious play can converge to an MSNE of the game. 22 Monderer and Shapley [86] provide an example in a 2-player 2-action normal-form (coordination) game with identical payoffs. Said differently, the resulting empirical distribution of play for the JA player may be to what Monderer and Shapley [86] themselves call a "purely mixed strategy" (i.e, every action is played with positive probability; or said differently, the corresponding probability mass function has full suport over the action set of the player). 23 In the context of belief inference, the resulting mixed-strategy would correspond to an (approximate) marginal distribution, not a particular joint-assignment. Hence, in the context of belief inference, the convergence of the procedure above may not have to be to a single (possibly local) optimum of the potential function Ψ X,T : in principle, convergence could be to a (non-deterministic) mixture over joint-assignments. In fact, this is what we observe in our experiments, albeit after only a finite number of iterations. A thorough understanding of the convergence properties observed in practice requires considerably more experimental work than is reasonable within the context and purpose of the work described in this manuscript.
Experiments
In this section we present the results of synthetic experiments on the performance of the gametheoretic-inspired heuristics we propose in this paper for approximate belief inference in MRFs. Our algorithms have very simple implementations. We also compare them with the most popular approximation algorithms and heuristics, with equally simple implementations, proposed in the literature on probabilistic graphical models.
Experimental Design
The experimental design in terms of the class of Ising models is as in Domke and Liu [88] . We consider Ising models with d × d simple grid graphs, which are planar (i.e., no "wrap around" edges, such that each of the four corner nodes have exactly two neighboring nodes, any other noninternal node has exactly three neighbors, while the rest, i.e., all internal nodes, have exactly four neighbors). Hence, the number of variables/nodes is n = d 2 . Also we did not consider edge-weights magnitude parameters 1.0 or 1.5, because it is really hard to beat a Gibbs sampler for maximum weight magnitudes smaller than 2.0, relative to the bias parameters b i 's being in the real-valued interval [−1, 1]. The reason for this might be that, because, as stated in Domke and Liu [88] , the mixing rate of a Gibbs sampler in such models grows roughly exponential with the magnitude, the induced Markov chain mixes pretty fast for such cases; thus convergence is quick. For each value w ∈ {2, 3, 4}, we generated random Ising models with edge-weights w ij ∼ Uniform([−w, w]) or w ij ∼ Uniform([0, w]) for the "mixed" or "attractive" case, respectively, for each (i, j) ∈ E, i.i.d., and node biases b i ∼ Uniform([−1, +1]), also i.i.d. for all i, and independent of the edge-weights.
One exception on the class of Ising models used for evaluation is a class we use with edge-weights with constant magnitude (i.e., w = max (i,j)∈E |w ij |), but in which we vary the probability q of attractive edge-weights; that is, given a probability q, the sign of the edge-weight are i.i.d. random variables in which the sign is positive with probability q, and negative with probability 1 − q. 24 We propose this class of Ising models for future evaluations of approximate belief inference techniques. For evaluation using this class, we consider w ∈ {2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0}. For each q, we randomly generated 50 Ising models as samples for w = 4, and 5 samples for each w = 4.
Note that despite the graphs being planar, the bias parameter is non-zero in general, so that the known polynomial-time exact algorithms for planar graphs do not technically apply.
Here, we consider a simple no-regret algorithm, which we denote as "nr" from now on. The algorithm guarantees to converge to (the set of approximate) CE [33] . While there are several such no-regret algorithms in the literature with the same convergence guarantees, we leave their evaluation for future work. Each iteration of nr takes roughly the same amount of time as that for Gibbs sampling. We set the number of iterations of the nr algorithm to 10 5 for the standard experimental setup, and to 10 6 for our proposed new evaluation setting. Our exact implementation is a natural adaptation we believe is more amenable to the belief-inference setting. In particular, we evaluate a version in which we update the mixed-strategy each player uses to draw an action at every iteration t as follows. For each player, (1) we set the probability of switching the player's last action being equal to the empirical regret, or 0 if the empirical regret is negative; and (2) we set the player's probability of playing action +1 by "damping" the currently suggested probability of playing +1, p t (1), for the corresponding player by the original algorithm:
25 that is, we use the update 0.99 × p t (1) + 0.01 × (0.5). We also use 10 5 iterations. Also, we only present results for the sequential, "semi-stochastic" fictitious play we discuss in Section 3.4, for the case of CE only, which we denote as "fp (ce)" from now on. We set the number of iterations m = 15.
26 Finally, the 24 The weight of each edge (i, j) ∈ E is a random variable of the form Wij = (2Sij − 1)w, where the Sij ∼ Bernoulli(q), i.i.d., and w is a positive constant. 25 The algorithm basis its suggested probability solely on the positively-truncated empirical regret. 26 That number of iterations is relatively low, but given that our implementation is in Octave, setting m = 15 is roughly the number of iterations for which the amount is roughly the same as that for our C implementation of TRW, as described in Wainwright et al. [15] , but without optimizing for the parameters ρij's, which we set to a constant = 0.55 for all edges (i, j) ∈ E. Clearly this is an unfair comparison for fp (ce). The optimization of ρij's involves performing a maximum spanning tree computation at each iteration until convergence, and this operation follows each TRW message-passing with fixed ρij's. While such an optimization is tractable, and optimizing for the ρij's does seem to improve the upper-bounds on the log-partition function, it is not clear results for the MSNE-instantiation of the fictitious play algorithm we propose are quite similar to those for fp (ce), at least for m = 15; thus, we omit those results in the interest of keeping the plots less "crowded" and thus easier to interpret.
We compare the simple nr algorithm and our proposed fp (ce) to (1) standard mean-field approximation (mf), with sequential/axis-parallel updates; (2) standard belief propagation (bp), with simultaneous updates; (3) TRW (trw); and (4) the Gibbs sampler (gs). In the next paragraph, we provide more detail on the specifics of the implementations of methods (1-4).
As baseline (bl), we use the simplest possible estimator from the perspective of average marginalerror to measure quality: always use 0.5 as the estimate of the exact marginal distribution of each variable. Certainly, one would expect that for an algorithm to be competitive, its performance should be better than bl. As we soon discuss, our experimental results suggest that this is not always the case; that is, several standard methods, including some of the ones proposed here and even stateof-the-art such as TRW, do not satisfy that condition for "hard" cases. We evaluate mean field (mf) using sequential/axis-parallel updates, stopping if the maximum absolute difference in probability values between iterations is ≤ 10 −5 , and using a maximum number of iterations = 10 6 . For belief propagation (bp) we use simultaneous updates, and "smooth" the update based on the average of the current value and the new value in order to "dampen" or at least try to prevent oscillations and improve the likelihood of convergence, 27 stopping if the maximum absolute difference in probability values between iterations is ≤ 10 −7 , and a maximum number of iterations = 10 5 . For tree reweighed message-passing (trw), we use a constant parameter ρ = 0.55 for all corresponding edge-appearance-probability parameters ρ ij 's [15] , along with a smooth update and the same stopping criterion as for bp. For the Gibbs sampler, we use 10 6 iterations.
Experimental Results and Discussion
Fig. 1 summarizes our results for the most common classes of Ising models considered in the experimental evaluation of approximation algorithms and heuristic for belief inference in the literature as described above. We perform hypothesis testing for the result in these classes of Ising models using paired z-tests on the individual (i.e., not joint) differences, each with p-value 0.05. Hence, all the statements are statistically significant with respect to such hypotesis tests. Note that there is no globally best approximation technique overall for these classes.
"Mixed" case (Left plot, Fig. 1 ). Clearly, gs is best for all w in this case. Among the other approximation algorithms, we observe the following Fig. 2 summarizes our experimental results for a class of Ising models which appears to lead to "harder" Ising-model instances. 28 We perform hypothesis testing for the result in these classes of Ising models using two approaches depending on w. For w = 4, where we draw 50 models as samples for each q, we use appropriately modified paired z-tests on the individual (i.e., not joint) differences, each with p-value 0.05. We modify the calculation of the variances resulting from the average over the samples computed for each q. We do so because the distributional properties of the empirical mean/average for each q may differ. For w < 4, where we only draw 5 models as samples for each q, we use bootstrapped-based, individual, paired hypothesis-testing over each pair of aggregate differences between the methods for each of those values of w; we use 100 bootstrap samples, and p-value 0.05 All the statements are statistically significant with respect to such hypotesis tests.
Aggregate results (Left plot, Fig. 2) . The left-hand plot in Fig. 2 shows the aggregate results for this case. There is no clear overall best over all q. We also observe the following.
1. fp (ce) is best for w = 4, while being second best to gs for w = 2 and to trw for w = 3;
and, for w = 2.5, tied for best with gs (i.e., indistinguishable from gs).
2. trw is consistently better than bp, mf, bl, and nr, except for w = 2.5 where trw is indistinguishable from bp; trw is consistently worst than fp (ce), except for w = 3 where trw is best, of course;
3. Only mf is worst than bl for w ∈ {2, 4}; mf is indistinguishable from bl for w ∈ {2.5, 3}; also, bp and nr are indistinguishable from bl, except for w = 2.5, where bp is better than bl.
4. bp is better than mf except for w = 2; bp is indistinguishable from nr for w ∈ {2, 3}, but bp is better than nr for w ∈ {2.5, 4}.
5. gs is consistently better than mf and nr; indistinguishable from trw except for w = 3 where trw is better, and, of course, for w = 2 where gs is tied for best with fp (ce).
Results for constant edge-weight magnitude w = 4 as a function of probability of attractive interaction q (Right plot, Fig. 2 ). The right-hand plot in Fig. 2 shows finer-grain results for this case. The results suggest that in fact such instances of Ising models tend to be harder in the sense that even state-of-the-art algorithms such as TRW are no better than the simple baseline estimation, in which p i = 0.5 for all nodes/variables i, for less than half of the full range of values of the sign probability q (i.e., for q ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9}). In fact, the performance of TRW is almost exactly the same as baseline accros the range of non-extreme values of q. (Note how the plot of the values for trw and bl are essentially on top of each other for values of q other than 0 or 1.) On the other hand, note how fp (ce) is consistently better than bl across the whole range of values for q. In fact, fp (ce) is always in the set of (statistically) best performers for all q: i.e., the single best for q = 1.0, and indistinguishable from trw for q = 0.0; gs and bp for q ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7}; nr, gs, and bp for q = 0.2; gs for q ∈ {0.3, 0.4, 0.9}; and gs and mf for q = 0.8. The proposed fp (ce) is also best at both extremes, while trw is only best when all weights are negative. Almost all the methods other than fp (ce) are no better, and often worst, than bl, except for bp and trw for q = 0.0; trw for q ∈ {0.2, 0.7, 1.0}; trw and gs for q = 0.3; and gs for q = 0.8. Fig. 3 plots the proportion of non-convergent runs of bp (higher curve) and trw (lower curve). Note the interesting behavior of bp: the likelihood of convergence diminishes considerably as q nears 0.5. The effect is almost symmetrical. In contrast, the effect on the non-convergence of trw is negligible. Note, however, that the bp's non-convergence does not seem to really affect its performance in terms of marginal error. This plot provides additional evidence for our claim that the generative model of random Ising models used for evaluation does lead to harder problem instances. The left and right plots are for the so-called "mixed" and "attractive" instances of Ising models, respectively. For both plots, the x-axis is the largest magnitude of the edge-weights: i.e., w = max (i,j)∈E |w ij |. The y-axis is the average, over 50 randomly generated Ising models, of the average, over all of the 64 variables, of the absolute difference between the estimate and exact marginal probability for the random variable corresponding to that node, along with their corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs). The legend in each plot is for different approximation algorithms: bl = baseline; mf = mean field; bp = belief propagation; trw = tree reweighed message-passing; nr = simple no-regret algorithm; gs = Gibbs sampler; and fp (ce) = the CE version of our version of the fictitious play for the 2-player potential game described in Section 3.4. We refer the reader to the main body for implementation details and a thorough discussion of the results.
Future Work and New Opportunities
It would be nice to have a better understanding of the exact relationship between the true joint distribution of the MRF and the equilibrium points of the induced graphical potential game. As an example of how this would be useful, it might give us a better idea as to whether one can think of a Gibbs sampler, or other Monte-Carlo sampling algorithms, as providing solutions to equilibrium problems of certain quality.
We still need to study the effect of the parameter d defining the grid graph for the Ising model on the effectiveness of all the approximation algorithms. We are currently setting up experiments on Ising models with a larger number of nodes. In particular, we are considering d = 12, which leads to n = 144 nodes/variables.
We also need to study the effect of the number of iterations m of the fp (ce) and nr on the quality of the estimates of the node-marginals, as well as the convergence rates. Also, we need to study the effect of m and d on algorithms such as the MSNE-instantiation of the fictitious-play heuristic we propose. Of course, we need to compare the results of such experimental studies with a similar study for gs; right now, we use 10 6 iterations for gs in our experiments. Similarly, we should study the effect of the stopping rules and maximum number of iterations for mf, bp, and trw on their marginal-error performance, as well as the effect of sequential vs. simultaneous updates for mf and bp on the same. We should also study more carefully the effect of varying or optimizing the edgeappearance parameters for trw on its marginal-error. Finally, we should empirically study the effect of "dampening" the updates for nr, bp, and trw on their performance.
The focus of the experimental evaluation in this paper was testing our proposed, game-theoreticallyinspired algorithms for belief inference with standard algorithms in the literature of probabilistic Fig. 1 , except the edge-weight magnitude w is constant for each interaction strength in the x-axis (i.e., 2, 2.5, 3, and 4), and nr uses 10 6 iterations. For all cases, the result is the average over all values of the probability of attractive interaction q ∈ {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0}, and over 5 Ising models for each q; except for the case of constant edge-weight magnitude w = 4, in which case the average for each q is over 50 Ising-model samples. Said differently, the overal average for the cases of w ∈ {2.0, 2.5, 3.0} is over a total of 55 Ising models, while those for the case of w = 4 is over a total of 550 models. Note that the standard 95% CIs based on a Gaussian approximation resulting from the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) do not directly apply here because the averages are over different q values, each of which may have different distributional properties (e.g., different variances). For w < 4, because we are computing the average marginal-error over every q, each based on only 5 samples, we use the bootstrap method to compute the 95% CIs over the overall average for each method and each w, using 100 samples. For w = 4, because we have 50 samples for each q, we use a properly adapted version of the standard 95% CIs which modifies the calculation of the overall variance to account for distributional differences from each q. (Right plot) Results for each q value with w = 4, with 50 models as samples for each, along with their corresponding individual 95% CIs computed as usual. We refer the reader to the main body for a thorough discussion.
graphical models with relatively "simple" implementations (e.g., do not require calls to software packages or the implementation of complex optimizations). An empirical study involving such algorithms with considerably more complex implementations must have a precise experimental methodology and design that accounts for not only the complexity of implementation, but also a fair comparison that achieves the right balance between measures of solution quality and running times. We leave such evaluations for future work because of the level of complexity required to carry them out correctly.
The work in this paper just "scratches the surface" in terms of the synergy between equilibirum computation in game theory and belief inference in probabilistic graphical models. We state and discuss several immediate theoretical, algorithmic, and computational implications, but many more may be possible. An even broader and more thorough literature review than the one provided in this manuscript is necessary to fully exploit this connection. Thus, many opportunities for novel contributions remain available in either direction. , and Varied Probability of Attractive Interactions q: Proportion of Non-convergent BP and TRW Runs. This plot shows proportion, along with standard individual 95% CIs, of non-convergent runs (y-axis) of bp (higher curve) and trw (lower curve), as a function of the probability of attractive interaction q (x-axis) for Ising models with constant edge-weights magnitude equal to 4. The setup is as described in the right plot of Fig. 2 for the case of edge-weight magnitude w = 4. The proportion is out of 50 runs for each q ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 1}. Note how the convergence of bp degrades when q nears 0.5. Note the almost symmetric effect on non-convergence for bp. Note also that bp non-convergence seems uncorrelated with its performance, as shown in Fig. 2 (Right plot) . While trw may also show non-convergence outside non-uniform edge-weights, the effect is less drastic than for bp.
Contributions
We provide general formulations of the problem of inference in MRFs as equilibrium computation in graphical potential games. We provide connections, particularly to variational inference approaches, with immediate algorithmic, computational, and theoretical implications to belief inference in probabilistic graphical models that follow immediately from the game-theory literature to various related problems. We provide two approaches for approximate belief inference: a local and a global approach. We experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in the context of Ising models with grid graphs, and provide a characterization of their computational effectiveness based on common measures used to characterize classes of Ising models (e.g., mixed and attractive models with different relative levels of magnitude between the edge weights and node bias values).
We also empirically evaluate effectiveness using a slightly different approach in which we keep the edge-weight magnitude constant but vary the "sign probability." We show how most methods are often not much better than a simple baseline (i.e., estimate that the marginal probabilities are all equal to 0.5) in that class of Ising models. Our results suggest that the proposed class of Ising models does indeed lead to harder instances than the popular models used for empirical evaluation in the same context of Ising models. We empirically show that our proposed method based on a global approach is best, beating even TRW within that class, and shinning in a class of Ising models with constant, "highly attractive" edge-weights, in which it is often better than all other alternatives we evaluated. Note that TRW is generally considered state-of-the-art. We propose such class of Ising models for future evaluations because our experimental results suggest that instances from that class are often the hardest. While our more local approach is not as effective as our global approach or TRW, in fairness, almost all of the alternatives are often no better than a simple baseline: estimate the marginal probability to be 0.5.
In closing, our hope is that the work presented in this manuscript will start a conversation on the synergy between equilibrium computation and belief inference, which appears to be an intriguing and potentially fruitful research direction for both mathematical, algorithmic, and computational game-theory and probabilistic graphical models.
